Written for my AP English Synthesiss Essay

Abstract

The last two decades have seen a political revolution around the Western world go largely unnoticed. Victor Orban and his far-right Fidesz Coalition have ruled Hungary with an iron fist for more than 10 years, stifling the rights of his people, suppressing the media, and funneling taxpayer funds to associates. In Poland, the right-wing Law and Justice Party under Mateusz Morawiecki was forced to shut down a disciplinary chamber for judges and engaged in similar corruption. Just last year, Giorgia Meloni was elected Prime Minister of Italy, with several academics describing her party as neo-fascist. In the US, the aftermath of Trumpism and the January 6th riots continue to derail American democracy.

In these past 20 years, the rise of right-wing populist politicians and parties has had a profound effect on the political landscape of the West. Their nativist and xenophobic policies have led to the restriction of immigration, and the acceptance of refugees. Their chauvinistic and paranoid rhetoric has led to the oppression of ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities. Their dominance in government has been immediately followed by restriction of the rights to free speech, press, and justice which are fundamental to democracy.

While many politicians and voters alike tend to downplay the legitimacy of the populist right’s beliefs, nobody can deny its destructive effects on democracy and everyday life. The term “populist” doesn’t even refer to any one political ideology, but rather a broad political tactic that aims to galvanize support from a wide range of disaffected individuals. Historically, this has been an incredibly effective strategy for revolutionaries to inspire an uprising against oppressive forces but is now being used by politicians to hate-monger and fear-monger swaths of voters who feel like the status quo doesn’t serve them.

Scholars, journalists, and politicians alike will claim that the rise of right-wing populism can be attributed to individual politicians, parties, or hateful rhetoric. While this may be true to certain extents, it is far more effective to examine the root cause of populism’s appeal to prevent its future rise. The allure of far-right populism goes deeper than a few charismatic figures or an intrinsic desire to be hateful, but can rather be attributed to economic disenfranchisement, social dissatisfaction, and technological growth which often go ignored. The rise of right-wing populism in the 21st century was inevitable, and voters, scholars, and politicians should attempt to sympathize with its supporters rather than attack it.

Economic conditions and human predispositions

Perhaps the largest cause of populism’s appeal was the widespread economic deprivation resulting from neoliberal and globalist policy over the last few decades. International trade has boomed, demand for cheap labor has increased, and costs of living have risen, meaning many citizens don’t feel the same degree of economic success as they did in the 80s and 90s. Navarro (2020) argues that the implementation of neoliberalism has increased unemployment, social polarization, and the power of large corporations, allowing them to weaken the power of labor unions and influence the government. Furthermore, the deregulation of labor markets has caused labor rigidity, job instability, and worsening living conditions. The unemployment caused by these policies has also led to worse individual psychological outcomes (Fryer and Stambe 2014).

After decades of failed economic policy, millions of people in the West felt let down by mainstream politicians who promised to help them. In those times of desperation, they turned to bolder, more radical leaders who convinced voters they would better represent them. The populist right in this sense operates like a chameleon – it doesn’t have a single fixed position, but it adapts between economic policies across the political spectrum to maintain its popularity. In 1995, Kitschelt and McGann claimed the populist “winning formula” uses liberal laissez-faire policies, whereas, in 2017, Muis et al. noted that it had majorly abandoned the free market for protectionism and welfare chauvinism. This was most likely due to the increase in global trade over those 20 years, which necessitated closed economies that shut out foreign labor to keep people’s jobs. This adaptiveness made it an easy choice for voters who felt they’d been disenfranchised by ‘establishment’ politicians and wanted a change of pace.

No matter what economic platform it stands behind though, all right-wing populist movements share one thing in common: they appeal to their voters’ innate biology. At heart, humans are tribal creatures who desire freedom, safety, and protection. As such, the hallmark of a good populist movement is to propagate a strong us-versus-them mentality, typically uniting their voters against some ‘elite’ or ‘ruling’ class as the cause of all their problems. Be that due to high taxes, job loss, or financial instability, this scapegoating can trigger the most visceral reflexes of fear and anger in their voters. It leads to an almost cult-like supporter base that is consistently passionate and dedicated to their cause, a cause they see as the fight between good and evil. If the ruling class is still in control, politicians and bureaucrats will continue to oppress you, so you should never rest until they have been overthrown. This polarizing rhetoric also has a strong undertone that tells voters “you’re either with us or against us”. This means that moderates don’t feel like any position represents them, and are pushed to one of the extremes.

Some may argue that individual politicians like Viktor Orban and his Fidesz Coalition in Hungary came to power based on their charisma, rather than societal conditions (Lendavi 2018). This is true – the success of right-wing populism would not be as pronounced without charismatic figures like Orban in Hungary and Trump in America, who were able to skyrocket the popularity of their movements using controversial rhetoric, effective media advertising, and cults of personality. However, their ideas were likely to become powerful anyway: Viktor Orban had a brief stint of power in 2006 but lost it soon after. The reason for his subsequent success in 2010 was that he realized how to correctly cater to a wide variety of disaffected Hungarians and their dissatisfaction with economic and cultural conditions. Although their role shouldn’t be ignored (Muis et al 2017), charismatic politicians were not the root cause of the problem, but rather the people who are swayed by them. If societal conditions had not caused a wide variety of people to feel disenfranchised and voiceless across the Western world, right-wing populists would have nobody to cater to, regardless of how charismatic they were.

Nostalgia and the pendulum of political extremities

In the last 20 years, we’ve also seen a greater increase in diversity than at any other point in history. Movements for civil rights, feminism, and the LGBT community have drastically increased inclusion for historically marginalized groups such as ethnic, racial, and sexual minorities. While this change has largely been good for society, it’s come quite drastically for those with traditionalist or conservative leanings who prefer older times. Russian artist and essayist Svetlana Boym identified in her book The Future of Nostalgia (2001), the difference between reflective and restorative nostalgia – the latter being a desire to return conditions to a prior state. This nostalgia plays a critical role in the cultural popularity of the populist right, a movement directly oppositional to societal progression.

In physics, Newton’s Third Law states that every action has an equal opposite reaction. While it may be useful for calculating the magnitude of forces acting on certain objects, its logic can be equally applied to politics: A societal shift towards one side of the political spectrum will inevitably be met with an equal shift in the opposite direction.

History illuminates us to a pendulum of political extremities, where if societal consensus sways too far to one side, it will often attempt to course-correct by swaying just as far to the opposite side. Take a look at Reconstruction in the United States, which freed slaves after the Civil War and gave them the same rights as white people. While it was a massive step towards equality, it was also met with equal pushback in the South which can be seen in the formation of groups such as the Ku Klux Klan. Their atrocious practices directly counteracted societal progress and were led by a group of radicals who wanted to return things to the ‘old days’. A similar pushback can be seen in the West as we speak: The alt-right in America, the English Defense League, and many other populist movements galvanize their supporters around a perceived loss of culture. Because of historical success, many Brits and Americans alike believe there is a sense of superiority ingrained in their culture, and any deference from that must be stopped. The defining slogan of Donald Trump’s presidency was literally “Make America Great Again”, and we already know how effective that was.

It has been shown that cultural conditions play an indistinguishable role from economic deprivation in the decision to vote for right-wing populist parties (Golder, 2016). This is likely due to these issues being played up in political campaigns: Trump making Mexican immigrants a central piece of his 2016 campaign, or Orban scapegoating racial and sexual minorities for the loss of Hungarian culture. Throughout history, fearmongering, hate-mongering, and scapegoating have been fundamental tactics for every authoritarian dictator in the past, the most successful of which being Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini. If populists can use these tactics to garner the support of millions of disaffected voters, they can wield a frightening amount of political influence.

The role of technology, media, and the Internet

This influence can be wielded extremely effectively when politicians utilize technology, the internet, and social media. With a proper Wi-Fi connection, everyone has access to a worldwide network where they can access the ideas of people across the globe. At the push of a button, everyone can share their political opinions on social media, regardless of how popular they may be. The exponential increase in these technologies gave a platform to viewpoints that previously lacked one. In the past, where ideas could only be communicated in person, it was very difficult for extremist ideologies to gain a large supporter base, whereas, in the 21st century, anyone has the power to build a group or community around even the most radical of beliefs.

Politicians have also realized this: Look to the radicalization of Trump’s voter base in 2015 using websites such as 4chan and the GamerGate controversy to engage millions of previously apathetic voters across the US (Romano 2021). In America, the “mainstream media” is split among partisan lines, with outlets such as Fox News aligning with the Republican Party, and channels such as Breitbart and OAN espousing beliefs held by the alt-right. More directly, there are also instances where right-wing governments have taken control of the media. In Orban’s Hungary, stories are binned, propaganda is broadcasted, and journalists are told to disregard objective facts if they don’t support the regime (Rankin et al 2022). Media is an incredibly important outlet for right-wing populists, as control of the media allows the suppression of dissent, monopoly on information, and control of which ideas are acceptable.

Behavioral economist Karen Stenner states in The Authoritarian Dynamic (2001) that about one-third of the population in any country has an “authoritarian predisposition”, or a specific proclivity for authoritarian ideals. In Twilight of Democracy (2020), Anne Applebaum defines these ideals as being “not closed-minded, but simple-minded” (83) – arguing that authoritarianism is an ideology for those opposed to complexity. This makes the Internet and social media ideal breeding grounds for right-wing populism, an ideology that shines in its simplicity. There is no need for political nuance in the space of 280 characters. In the age of technology, it’s the flashy headlines, brash statements, and outrageous opinions that garner the most attention. The exponential rise of technology in the last 20 years has greatly expedited the rise of right-wing populism, making it far more accessible and palatable to the masses.

Policy suggestions and the importance of sympathy

Amidst these factors, books such as Applebaum’s Twilight of Democracy paint a bleak and hopeless future for democracy. However, not all hope is lost – there are three main steps that could be taken to combat the popularity of far-right populism: i) An increase in credible information being shared, especially on the Internet (Muiz et al 2017) to combat disinformation; ii) Politicians with more moderate positions that seem relatable; and iii) policies specifically targeted towards the factors outlined in this essay, which make populism so appealing.

Most importantly, we ought to sympathize with those affected by far-right populists and view them as victims instead of villains. Imagine the average working-class citizen who lost his job due to drastic economic developments. They are easily ignited with fiery populist rhetoric which scapegoats minorities, but likely won’t understand the larger structural problems which caused their circumstances. If governments wanted to make populism less appealing to those people, it would be more effective to improve everyone’s standard of living instead of marking voters as the problem. Right-wing populism cannot be combatted through a top-down approach, but rather a bottom-up one that focuses on the individual citizen and why they might be susceptible to those ideals. Although the rise of populism was inevitable, not all hope is lost for democracy, and we can work to preserve it as long as we remain sympathetic, nuanced, and vigilant.

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Works Cited

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Romano, Aja. “What We Still Haven’t Learned from Gamergate.” Vox, Vox, 20 Jan. 2020, https://www.vox.com/culture/2020/1/20/20808875/gamergate-lessons-cultural-impact-changes-harassment-laws.

Stenner, Karen. The Authoritarian Dynamic. Cambridge University Press, 2005.

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